The Sartorial Dilemma of Knockoffs: Protecting Moral Rights without Disturbing the Fashion Dynamic by Wade, Margaret E.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2011
The Sartorial Dilemma of Knockoffs: Protecting
Moral Rights without Disturbing the Fashion
Dynamic
Margaret E. Wade
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wade, Margaret E., "The Sartorial Dilemma of Knockoffs: Protecting Moral Rights without Disturbing the Fashion Dynamic" (2011).
Minnesota Law Review. 390.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/390
  
336 
Note 
 
The Sartorial Dilemma of Knockoffs: Protecting 
Moral Rights without Disturbing the Fashion 
Dynamic 
Margaret E. Wade 
In the months leading up to the wedding of Prince William 
and Catherine Middleton‘s wedding, the future Duke and  
Duchess of Cambridge kept Catherine‘s gown a secret. But as 
soon as she stepped out to reveal Sarah Burton‘s Alexander 
McQueen creation to the world, copycat designers began work-
ing on knockoffs available for a fraction of the price.1 A similar 
phenomenon occurs every year during awards season, when 
film and television stars parade in couture gowns on the red 
carpet and copycat designers immediately manufacture repli-
cas.2 Beyond the glitz of high couture, an emerging designer‘s 
worst nightmare is to discover copies of her original designs in 
―fast fashion‖ stores like H&M, Zara, and Forever 21.3 In a typ-
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 1. See Cheryl Wischhover, The First Kate Middleton Knockoff Wedding 
Gowns and Accessories Hit Stores; Here Are the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 
FASHIONISTA (May 2, 2011, 12:10 PM), http://fashionista.com/2011/05/check-out 
-the-first-kate-middleton-knockoff-wedding-gowns-and-accessories/; see also 
Now You Can Own a Kate Middleton Knockoff Ring, GAWKER (Nov. 20, 2010, 
9:12 AM), http://gawker.com/5695043/now-you-can-own-a-kate-middleton-knockoff 
-ring (highlighting one example of a Kate Middleton engagement ring knockoff ).  
 2. See About Us, FAVIANA, http://www.faviana.com/about-us-en.php ( last 
visited Oct. 15, 2011) (revealing an industry where copycat designers create 
seemingly identical dresses minutes after an awards ceremony).  
 3. Guillermo C. Jimenez, Fashion Law: Overview of a New Legal Disci-
pline, in FASHION LAW 3, 8 (Guillermo C. Jimenez & Barbara Kolsun eds., 
2010) (noting that the ―fast fashion‖ model, pioneered by Spanish clothing re-
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ical case, designer Elle Sakellis‘ Otrera ―evil eye‖ scarves, 
priced at $190, were a huge success until her retailers began 
ordering a knockoff version that sold for only $30.4 Fashion pi-
racy is not a new phenomenon, but with the rise of new tech-
nology and evolving consumer behaviors, copycat fashion is 
more common than ever before.5  
Unlike that of most other countries, U.S. copyright law 
does not extend to fashion designs.6 Although other forms of in-
tellectual property protect fashion products, the cut of a gar-
ment is not protected.7 After nearly a century of lobbying from 
fashion designers, there are two bills—the Design Piracy Pro-
hibition Act (DPPA)8 and the Innovative Design Protection and 
Piracy Prevention Act (IDPPPA)9—that aim to reform the copy-
right system to include fashion designs. However, critics claim 
that protection for fashion designs is unnecessary because the 
fashion industry is thriving and copying drives innovation.10  
This Note evaluates whether the Copyright Act should be 
expanded to include fashion design. Part I provides an overview 
of fashion piracy, the current state of intellectual property pro-
tection for fashion, and the proposed legislation for a fashion 
 
tailer Zara, creates a ―competitive advantage in speed to market‖ through the 
use of information technology).  
 4. Christina Binkley, The Problem With Being a Trendsetter: Copycat 
Fashions Move Faster Than Ever, Making It Harder to Protect Original Ideas; 
Smaller Designers Bear the Brunt, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2010, at D8.  
 5. E.g., Judith S. Roth & David Jacoby, Copyright Protection and Fa-
shion Design, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW 2009, at 1099 (PLI 
Intellectual Prop. Handbook Ser. No. G-967, 2009) (―The advent of online, real 
time access to the exhibition of new designs and rapid-fire manufacturing ca-
pabilities through CAD and other technological advances have facilitated de-
sign piracy.‖); Reasons to Stop Fashion Piracy: The Testimony of Susan Scafi-
di, STOP FASHION PIRACY, http://www.stopfashionpiracy.com/index.php/about_ 
the_bill/ ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (―Today, global changes in both the speed 
of information transfer and the locus of clothing and textile production have 
resulted in increased pressure on creative designers at all levels, from haute 
couture to mass market.‖). 
 6. E.g., Susan Scafidi, Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Historical Regres-
sion, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Mar. 10, 2008, 11:28 PM), http://counterfeitchic.com/ 
2008/03/index.php. 
 7. E.g., Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm‘n, 
114 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1940) (stating that dress designs are not copyrightable 
and ―fall into the public demesne without reserve‖), aff ’d, 312 U.S. 457, 460 
n.1 (1941). 
 8. H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 9. S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2010). 
 10. E.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: In-
novation and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 
1691 (2006).  
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design copyright. Part II considers both sides of the debate, 
analyzing the pros and cons in the arguments of the proponents 
and the critics. Part III argues against current fashion legisla-
tion that would expand the Copyright Act and proposes a solu-
tion that balances moral rights and the benefits of copying. 
This Note asserts that the costs of sui generis11 copyright pro-
tection outweigh the benefits, and a certification or collective 
mark would be a better fit for the fashion industry. 
I.  FASHION PIRACY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND 
LEGISLATION   
The fashion industry is unparalleled in its social and eco-
nomic significance.12 This Part illustrates the phenomenon of 
fashion piracy, including both the positive and negative aspects 
of copying. It then discusses the current state of intellectual 
property protections for fashion designers, including an over-
view of trademarks, trade dress, patents, trade secret, and cop-
yrights. Finally, this Part provides background on recent and 
current legislation—the DPPA and the IDPPPA. 
A. FASHION PIRACY: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 
In order to understand the complexity of fashion piracy, 
there are several important distinctions to make regarding the 
act of copying, the designers, and the timing.  
First, fashion piracy is a very difficult concept to define be-
cause it rests on subjective notions of copying.13 There is no 
bright line between copying and mere imitation, but fashion pi-
racy is best illustrated by a spectrum of permissible to imper-
missible copying activity juxtaposed with ethics.14 However, 
 
 11. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th ed. 2009) (defining ―sui generis‖—
Latin for ―[o]f its own kind‖—as a term used in intellectual property law ―to 
describe a regime designed to protect rights that fall outside the traditional 
patent, trademark, copyright, and trade-secret doctrines‖).  
 12. See Jimenez, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that the fashion and apparel 
sector accounts for about four percent of total gross domestic product or more 
than $1 trillion per year). 
 13. For an example of one designer‘s perspective on copying that high-
lights the subjectivity inherent in the debate on copying in the fashion indus-
try, see Eric Wilson, O.K., Knockoffs, This Is War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, 
at G2 (―[Protecting fashion design] is the most ridiculous thing. . . . There is no 
such thing as an original design. All these designers are getting their inspira-
tion from things that were done before. To me a spaghetti strap is a spaghetti 
strap, and a cowl neck is a cowl neck.‖). 
 14. See SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? 18 (2005) (discussing the 
implications of an ethical justification for the legal creation and protection of 
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some designers find all copying permissible and other designers 
draw a line between inspiration and copying.15 According to the 
Council of Fashion Designers of America (CFDA), fashion de-
sign piracy ―describes the increasingly prevalent practice of en-
terprises that seek to profit from the invention of others by 
producing copies of original designs under a different label.‖16 
However, a degree of copying is inevitable since there are only 
a limited number of ways that material may cover the human 
form; whenever a designer creates, she must take old ideas and 
make them her own.17 Copying is beneficial in many respects 
because it allows for collaboration and creativity.18 Every sea-
son is marked by trends; designers are inspired by the work of 
other designers.19 In a highly vulnerable industry, when one  
fashion company‘s collection finds success, other companies will 
follow to capitalize on the trend.20 The key legal question is at 
what point does copying a trend go too far.21 
Although the terms ―knockoff‖ and ―counterfeit‖ are often 
used synonymously in ordinary discourse, there is an important 
 
intellectual property); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Art-
ists’ Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 95, 143 (1997) (―[T]he overlap between moral rights and copyright em-
phasizes the extent to which copyright itself serves to give authors and artists 
continuing control over the way in which their work is exploited and, hence, 
over their reputation.‖). 
 15. ULLA VAD LANE-ROWLEY, USING DESIGN PROTECTION IN THE FASHION 
AND TEXTILE INDUSTRY 17 (1997) (quoting Italian designer Mario Bellini as 
stating that ―[w]hat makes me happy is when I am imitated in a rather clever 
way, that is the right way . . . [b]ut if someone copies the details, I feel robbed 
of money and of my inventive rights‖).  
 16. Design Piracy, COUNCIL OF FASHION DESIGNERS OF AM., http://www 
.cfda.com/design-piracy/ ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011); see also Fashion Origina-
tors Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm‘n, 114 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1940), 
aff ’d, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941); SYLVAN GOTSHAL, THE PIRATES WILL GET 
YOU: A STORY OF THE FIGHT FOR DESIGN PROTECTION 2 (1945) (―Piracy was 
formerly associated with the high seas. We know that it takes place also on 
the highways of trade and doesn‘t call for a patch on the eye; only a faulty con-
science and a sly hand . . . . Piracy is unauthorized taking, none the less so 
when what is taken is a thing of beauty.‖). 
 17. See, e.g., SUE JENKYN JONES, FASHION DESIGN 74 (2d ed. 2005); SCA-
FIDI, supra note 14, at 39. 
 18. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER & LAURIE RACINE, THE NORMAN LEAR CTR., 
READY TO SHARE: CREATIVITY IN FASHION & DIGITAL CULTURE 13–17 (Jan. 29, 
2005), available at http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/RTSBollierRacine.pdf. 
 19. See SHARON LEE TATE, INSIDE FASHION DESIGN 194 (5th ed. 2004). 
 20. See Wilson, supra note 13. 
 21. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 16 (―It is necessary to distinguish legal and 
acceptable forms of imitation from those that involve inappropriate use of 
another company‘s IP.‖). 
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legal distinction between these terms.22 Fashion design knock-
offs are legal, as illustrated by a dress sold in Forever 21 that 
appears indistinguishable from the original Diane Von Furs-
tenberg design.23 On the other hand, counterfeits of fashion 
names and logos are illegal, as seen by sunglasses with an un-
authorized Dolce and Gabbana logo sold on Canal Street in 
Manhattan.24 Identifying this gap in protection, many design-
ers are particularly upset when a copycat designer crosses the 
blurry line from inspiration to knockoff.25  
Second, fashion piracy has a disparate effect on design-
ers.26 Fashion is a very hierarchical business, often illustrated 
by a value pyramid, placing the high-end garments at the top 
and the lower-priced garments at the base, indicating the ―pro-
portion of total sales earned respectively by fashion‖ and lower-
priced basics.27 Established fashion designers and couture 
houses at the top of the pyramid have the resources and in-
house legal teams to combat copycats with extralegal and intel-
lectual property remedies.28 Moreover, these established de-
signers often appreciate copycat designers because there is no 
threat, only flattery.29 Fashion houses have such strong brand 
recognition that copycat designs hardly faze them because their 
 
 22. Id. at 16–17 (clarifying the distinctions between legal knockoffs, ille-
gal knockoffs, and counterfeiting). 
 23. Id. at 8–9. 
 24. Id. at 16–17. 
 25. E.g., The Industry Speaks Out, STOP FASHION PIRACY, http://www 
.stopfashionpiracy.com/index.php/the_industry_speaks_out/ ( last visited Oct. 
15, 2011) (―My designs are known for their sophisticated shapes and feminine 
silhouettes. The fit, cut, and detailing of our clothes are as much a part of the 
Oscar de la Renta brand as our logo itself. They are just as recognizable to our 
customers and should be protected equally.‖).  
 26. Binkley, supra note 4 ( lamenting on the burdens imposed on design-
ers who are faced with piracy in the fashion market). 
 27. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 12–13, 13 fig.1.2; Raustiala & Sprigman, su-
pra note 10, at 1693–94, 94 fig.A.  
 28. Your Questions, LOUIS VUITTON, http://www.louisvuitton.com/us/flash/ 
index.jsp?direct1=home_entry_us ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Your 
Questions] (―To combat [the scourge of counterfeiting], a special team has been 
set up in Paris, with offices abroad. Louis Vuitton works with various French 
and international professional associations to make consumers aware of the 
risks inherent to the purchase of counterfeits.‖). 
 29. Cameron Silver, President, Decades, Inc., Presentation at Ready to 
Share: Fashion & the Ownership of Creativity 127 (Jan. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.learcenter.org/pdf/RTStranscript.pdf (―Coco [Chanel] loved [the 
Fauxnel movement] because she said she always wanted to inspire the 
street . . . . She encouraged the copying . . . . She wasn‘t threatened by the cop-
ies because the truth is the cut could not be replicated.‖). 
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loyal consumers identify the original garment and choose to 
buy the original over the knockoff.30 Fashion houses also have 
the resources to compete with copycat designers by knocking off 
their own brands, as seen by Isaac Mizrahi‘s relationship with 
Target and Chanel designer Karl Lagerfeld‘s line for H&M.31 
Although fashion piracy is a concern for designers at all levels, 
there are many options by which an established fashion design 
house may protect its designs.32  
Many emerging designers, on the other hand, struggle to 
enter the market when they have to compete with copycats and 
established brands.33 ―Everyone always says that imitation is 
the best form of flattery. But it happened too soon . . . . I‘m not 
Louis Vuitton. It‘s not like when someone buys a Raj scarf that 
they know it‘s an Otrera knockoff,‖ Designer Elle Sakellis 
said.34 Since designers must fund the design process on their 
own, designers such as Sakellis risk losing their entire invest-
ment when a copycat steals their designs.35 Copying can short-
circuit the fashion cycle by devaluing the designer‘s garment 
before she can reap any return on the investment.36 Copying di-
lutes the brand and creates confusion as a young designer at-
tempts to establish her label.37 Unlike the established brand, 
whose product is easily distinguishable from copycat versions, 
an emerging designer‘s garment does not likely indicate a 
unique source, increasing its vulnerability.38 Unlike high-
 
 30. See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 121 (Peter K. Yu ed., 
2007) (―Even if a famous designer‘s new line is knocked off, consumers may 
still be willing to pay higher prices for the [original].‖). 
 31. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1724 (describing ―single-firm 
price discrimination strategy‖ or vertical integration, before noting several de-
signers who successfully employ such strategies); Adam Jones & Elizabeth 
Rigby, A Good Fit? Designers and Mass-Market Chains Try to Stitch Their 
Fortunes Together, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2005, at 17.  
 32. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1724. 
 33. Scafidi, supra note 30 (noting that emerging designers ―cannot depend 
exclusively on brand recognition for protection against design piracy‖).  
 34. Binkley, supra note 4. 
 35. See id.  
 36. See Scafidi, supra note 30, at 125 (describing the ―pattern of consumer 
behavior that luxury goods industries can under limited circumstances lever-
age to create desire for new products‖). 
 37. See id.  
 38. Binkley, supra note 4 (elaborating on the unique difficulties that up-
and-coming fashion designers face when confronted with knockoffs of their 
original designs). 
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fashion knockoffs, the scenario where emerging designers are 
knocked off results in great harm to the new designer.39  
Third, the current call for fashion design legislation is 
nothing new: designers have fervently cried out against design 
piracy for decades.40 There is a long history of the American fa-
shion industry copying other designers.41 For example, in 1964, 
more than 2,000 women flocked to Ohrbach‘s ―semi-annual fa-
shion phenomenon‖ in search of ―line-for-line copies‖ of Paris 
couture originals.42 The fashion world is notorious for its frenet-
ic pace, demanding fashionistas, and strictly choreographed 
routine of spectacular performances.43 Amidst this atmosphere, 
copying is standard practice in the fashion business.44 Copycats 
snap photos of dresses on the red carpet or the catwalk and 
immediately send the photos to factories in China to reproduce 
identical garments.45 
 
 39. Id. (―Small designers face a particularly large burden; often, they lack 
deep pockets to chase down versions they find similar, and their brands are so 
little-known that customers often aren‘t aware they‘re not buying an original 
design.‖). 
 40. See also Fashion Originators Guild of Am., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm‘n, 
114 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1940) (establishing that members of a major fashion 
guild have gone as far as boycotting retailers who sold knockoffs), aff ’d, 312 
U.S. 457, 468 (1941). See generally Kenneth Collins, Style Piracy, WOMEN‘S 
WEAR DAILY, Sept. 25, 1958, reprinted in INSIDE THE FASHION BUSINESS: 
TEXT AND READINGS 203, 203 (Jeannette A. Jarnow ed., 2d ed. 1974) (―As ev-
erybody knows, the latest Paris openings were marred by bitter charges of 
style piracy. No one claimed there was anything new about the situation ex-
cept the speed with which the fashion thieves worked.‖). 
 41. E.g., BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 18, at 8. 
 42. Marilyn Hoffman, Meet Manhattan, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 
24, 1964, reprinted in INSIDE THE FASHION BUSINESS: TEXT AND READINGS, 
supra note 40, at 204–05.  
 43. See Jimenez, supra note 3, at 15–16 (describing how clothing manu-
facturers produce seasonal couture collections six times per year, including 
Spring, Summer, Transitional, Fall, Resort, and Holiday, which are shown at 
shows in New York, London, Milan, and Paris).  
 44. See, e.g., INSIDE THE FASHION BUSINESS: TEXT AND READINGS, supra 
note 40, at 128 (―The late Norman Norell, considered the dean of American de-
signers, expressed his philosophy about style piracy: ‗I don‘t mind if the knock-
off houses give me a season with my dress. What I mind is if they bring out 
their copies faster than I get my own dresses to the stores.‘‖).  
 45. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflec-
tions on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 
91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1392 (2005); see also John Harlow, 2010 Oscars: Copycat 
Dresses on Sale Within a Week, THE SUNDAY TIMES ONLINE (Mar. 7, 2010), 
http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/arts_and_entertainment/film/oscars/ 
article7052414.ece ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (illustrating the phenomenon of 
knocking off gowns during awards season). 
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However, despite the copying norm in the industry, piracy 
is heightened in the information age in which the Internet and 
digital technology allows copying to occur faster and faster.46 In 
2006, lost revenue due to counterfeiting and piracy of fashion 
was estimated to be $12 billion.47 Consumer buying behavior 
has changed in response to e-commerce, shifting apparel sales 
to online retailers that employ new strategies like flash sales 
and membership-only benefits.48 Fashion has also exploded in 
pop culture through reality television shows that illustrate the 
trajectory of an emerging designer.49 The fashion blogosphere 
has expanded fashion consciousness far beyond New York City 
and Los Angeles, allowing people around the world to follow 
brands via more than 1000 fashion blogs.50 Fashion bloggers 
have assumed an increasingly more important role in fashion.51 
For example, in 2009 bloggers were first seated in the front row 
at fashion shows, and Marc Jacobs created an ostrich bag 
named the BB after blogger BryanBoy.52 The exponential 
growth of mobile blogging is making a huge impact on the fash-
ion world, speeding up the natural proliferation of trends.53 In 
the information age, fashion is venturing beyond the runway to 
 
 46. See, e.g., Scafidi, supra note 30, at 125–26.  
 47. Roth & Jacoby, supra note 5, at 1083.  
 48. See generally Andrew Rice, What’s a Dress Worth?, The Online Retail-
er Gilt Groupe Offers a Great Deal: Buy Designer Clothes at Deep Discounts. 
But is it Good or Bad for Fashion?, NEW YORK MAG., Feb. 14, 2010, at 76. 
Other examples of analogous retailers include HauteLook, Rue LaLa, and One 
Kings Lane.  
 49. See, e.g., Project Runway (Weinstein Co. broadcast Dec. 1, 2004–
present). 
 50. For examples of such fashion blogs, see BRYANBOY, http://www 
.bryanboy.com/; INDEPENDENT FASHION BLOGGERS, http://heartifb.com/; Scott 
Schuman, THE SARTORIALIST, http://thesartorialist.com/; see also Cate T. Cor-
coran, Marketing’s New Rage: Brands Sponsoring Influential Bloggers, WOM-
EN‘S WEAR DAILY (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.wwd.com/media-news/marketing/ 
marketings-new-rage-brands-sponsor-influential-bloggers-3230386/print-preview/. 
 51. See, e.g., Corcoran, supra note 50 (quoting another blogger as stating 
that ―[f ]ashion bloggers are a unique combination of publisher and talent,‖ 
and suggesting that ―[t]his is part of the next evolution of advertising[—]a 
more integrated approach‖). 
 52. Cate T. Corcoran, Fashion’s New Fever: Bloggers in Spotlight as They 
Aim for Fame, WOMEN‘S WEAR DAILY (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.wwd.com/ 
media-news/media-features/fashions-new-fever-bloggers-in-spotlight-as-they-aim 
-for-fame-2485957/print-preview/. 
 53. See Jon Sobel, State of the Blogosphere 2010 Introduction, TECHNORA-
TI (Nov. 3, 2010, 9:04 AM), http://technorati.com/blogging/article/state-of-the 
-blogosphere-2010-introduction/ (―The significant growth of mobile blogging is 
a key trend this year . . . . [The impact of women bloggers] is perhaps felt most 
strongly by brands . . . .‖). 
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explore new domains and reach new audiences, provoking a 
discussion of whether these changes are good or bad for the in-
dustry.54 Consequently, the call for protection of fashion de-
signs resounds with greater urgency.  
The unique features of copying, designers, and timing fuel 
the debate and reinforce the complex nature of the legal issue.55  
B. THE CURRENT STATE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGNERS 
Although the fashion industry is a major economic pres-
ence in the United States, federal law protects fashion design-
ers against only some forms of design piracy.56 The current in-
tellectual property regime provides partial protection for 
fashion products through a combination of trademarks, trade 
dress, patents, trade secrets, and copyrights.57  
1. Trademarks  
A trademark is most often a brand name or a logo that in-
dicates the source of a particular product.58 For example, 
trademark law protects clothing and accessories adorned with a 
label, such as a Louis Vuitton purse with the renowned ―LV‖ 
logo59 or the stitching pattern on a pair of Levis.60 To achieve 
trademark protection under the Lanham Act, the name or sym-
bol on a fashion product must distinguish it from other goods in 
commerce.61 Trademark law serves dual purposes in preventing 
 
 54. See, e.g., Mercedes, Cheap Chic: Do Knockoffs Actually Hurt Designers’ 
Sales?, GLOBAL PURCHASING COS. FASHION BLOG (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www 
.globalpurchasinggroup.com/blog/cheap-chic-do-knockoffs-actually-hurt-designers 
-sales/. 
 55. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 5 (describing the increasing need for fashion 
executives to become more knowledgeable about the law as a function of the 
unique characteristics of the industry). 
 56. See, e.g., Malden Mills, Inc. v. Regency Mills, Inc., 626 F.2d 1112, 
1113–14 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a copyright owner of a textile design was 
entitled to permanent injunction and damages against another design of sub-
stantially similar subject matter, representation, shading, composition, and 
relative size and placement of elements).  
 57. See, e.g., Scafidi, supra note 30, at 121–23. 
 58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995); see also 
RUDOLF CALLMANN, 3 THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND 
MONOPOLIES § 17.1 (4th ed. 1981). 
 59. Your Questions, supra note 28 (illustrating ongoing efforts to protect 
Louis Vuitton‘s famous ―LV‖ logo). 
 60. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 
871 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 61. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  
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consumer deception in the marketplace and protecting a  
fashion company‘s trademark from infringement.62 Although 
trademarks do not protect fashion designs, they play a vital 
role in preventing consumer confusion with counterfeit fashion 
products, namely bags and accessories.63  
2. Trade Dress 
Trade dress, a subset of trademark law, protects ―a prod-
uct‘s design, product packaging, color, or other distinguishing, 
nonfunctional element of appearance.‖64 For example, trade 
dress protects the look of well-known products like a Coca-Cola 
bottle65 and a red-and-white pack of Marlboro cigarettes.66 In 
2000, the Supreme Court narrowed the applicability of trade 
dress when it declined to extend trade dress protection to fash-
ion design in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.67 
However, like the greater body of trademark law, trade dress 
remains an option for famous accessories, such as the Long-
champ Le Pliage tote.68 
3. Patents 
Utility patents protect new and useful processes and in-
ventions,69 and design patents protect the ornamental features 
 
 62. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:2 (4th ed. 2010). 
 63. E.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 
115–19 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 64. Glossary, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/main/ 
glossary/index.html ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 
(2006) (codifying a similar explanation of the phrase ―trade dress‖). 
 65. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 215 (2000) 
(―[A] classic glass Coca Cola bottle, for instance, may constitute packaging for 
those consumers who drink the Coke and then discard the bottle, but may con-
stitute the product itself for those consumers who are bottle collectors, or part 
of the product itself for those consumers who buy Coke in the classic glass bot-
tle, rather than a can, because they think it more stylish to drink from the 
former.‖). 
 66. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Star Tobacco Corp., 879 F. Supp. 379, 385–88 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 62, § 8:4.50 ( listing ―the 
‗Marlboro Man‘ western cowboy motif ‖ as one of many examples of protected 
trade dress).  
 67. 529 U.S. at 216 (―[ I ]n an action for infringement of unregistered trade 
dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product‘s design is distinctive, and 
therefore protectible[sic], only upon a showing of secondary meaning.‖). 
 68. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 53 fig.2.2. 
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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of an invention.70 Although patent law primarily caters to 
scientists and inventors, fashion designers enjoy some patent 
protection.71 
Design patents protect the ornamental design of a product 
for a term of fourteen years.72 The most common fashion prod-
ucts to acquire this type of patent are accessories like eyeglass 
frames, jewelry, and footwear.73 In order to claim a design pa-
tent, the product must be novel, nonobvious, and ornamental.74 
On the other hand, utility patents protect functional innova-
tions for a term of 20 years.75 In order to claim a utility patent, 
a product must be novel,76 nonobvious,77 and useful.78 In fash-
ion, utility patents protect inventions such as Velcro fasteners, 
Lycra high-performance textiles, and hazmat gear.79 Utility pa-
tents also protect processes, such as a technique for washing 
denim jeans to create a specific look.80 Although there are rare 
cases where fashion designers have successfully obtained utili-
ty patents, the threshold for patent protection is very difficult 
to meet.81 The novelty standard essentially prevents an inven-
tor from patenting something that already has an identical 
form in the public domain.82 The nonobviousness requirement 
goes further, preventing an individual from obtaining a patent 
if it is similar enough to other products that people in the in-
dustry could have conceived it.83 These requirements prove dif-
ficult for a designer to meet because fashions evolve from prior 
fashions, and it would be nearly impossible to invent an entire-
ly new and nonobvious garment.84  
 
 70. Id. § 171. 
 71. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 59–66 (describing various protections pro-
vided by and limitations inherent in design and utility patents). 
 72. 35 U.S.C. § 173.  
 73. See, e.g., Jimenez, supra note 3, at 60.  
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 171.  
 75. Id. § 154(a)(2).  
 76. Id. § 102.  
 77. Id. § 112.  
 78. Id. § 101. 
 79. Scafidi, supra note 30, at 122. 
 80. E.g., Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade. S.r.L., Nos. 92 Civ. 1667 
(RPP), 90 Civ. 6291 (RPP), 90 Civ. 6292 (RPP), 1995 WL 710822, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1995).  
 81. Cf. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 65 (noting that utility patent protection 
―is difficult and costly to obtain and costly to maintain‖). 
 82. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 83. Id. § 103. 
 84. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Olga Co., 510 F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 
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In addition to the steep threshold requirements for patent 
protection, there are practical concerns as a result of the short 
timeline to produce fashion apparel and the long timeline to 
process a patent application. For 2009, the average total pen-
dency for a patent application was 34.6 months.85 Fashion de-
signers produce at least three or four shows a year, and the 
commercial life of a piece of apparel is only a few seasons.86 Al-
so, securing a patent is expensive because of fees charged by 
the USPTO for examination,87 as well as attorneys‘ fees. There-
fore, patent law does not provide a proper safeguard for fashion 
designs because the process of obtaining a patent is too time-
consuming and expensive for most fashion designers.88  
4. Trade Secret 
A trade secret is valuable information that maintains an 
economic advantage over competitors.89 For example, a trade 
secret may be a secret recipe, a manufacturing technique, or a 
customer list.90 Trade secret protection can theoretically last 
forever, but once it leaks out, it is gone.91 In the fashion world, 
designers may keep trade secrets for techniques, such as de-
signer Miriam Carlson‘s process for sewing flakes of the miner-
al mica on delicate fabric.92 However, even if the patterns for a 
 
1975); CHRISTINE COX & JENNIFER JENKINS, BETWEEN THE SEAMS, A FERTILE 
COMMONS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FASHION AND IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5–7 (Jan. 29, 2005), available at http://www.learcenter 
.org/pdf/RTSJenkinsCox.pdf.  
 85. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTA-
BILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, (2010) at B, available at http://www.uspto 
.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf. 
 86. See Wm. Filene‘s Sons Co. v. Fashion Originators‘ Guild of Am., Inc., 
90 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1937); Samantha L. Hetherington, Fashion Runways 
Are No Longer the Public Domain: Applying the Common Law Right of Public-
ity to Haute Couture Fashion Design, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 43, 47 
(2001) ( lamenting on the extensive investments of time and energy necessary 
for leading designers to continually update their fashion lines). 
 87. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(3) (2006) (indicating the requirements to file a 
design patent application include a $310 fee, and then there is a $430 fee for 
the design patent to issue). 
 88. See Scafidi, supra note 30, at 115, 122. 
 89. George Gottlieb et al., An Introduction to Intellectual Property Protec-
tion in Fashion, in FASHION LAW, supra note 3, at 37.  
 90. E.g., Paula M. Weber, From Hire to Fire: Contracts During the Em-
ployment Relationship, in ADVANCED SEMINAR ON COPYRIGHT LAW 2009, su-
pra note 5, at 280.  
 91. Gottlieb, supra note 89. 
 92. See Elizabeth Davies, Miriam Cecilia Carlson, ROCKFORD WOMAN 
(Apr. 23, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.rockfordwoman.com/content/miriam-cecilia 
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garment are kept secret, most clothing can easily be reverse-
engineered,93 so trade secrets provide little protection for  
fashion designs.  
5. Copyrights 
Copyright law protects artistic creations—including litera-
ture, song, dance, sculpture, painting, photography, movies, 
and computer programs—but not ―useful articles‖ like automo-
biles or clothing.94 Clothing may seem like art, but courts have 
classified it as a useful article because it provides warmth and 
covers nakedness.95 The legislative history from the enactment 
of the Copyright Act explains this separability rule, indicating 
that copyright protection would not be extended to useful ar-
ticles that are not separable from utilitarian elements.96 In ad-
dition, copyright does not protect ideas like a sleeve, but it does 
protect the expression of ideas like a fabric pattern.97 Although 
fashion design is excluded from the copyright regime, fashion 
designers still use copyrights to protect fabric prints,98 and im-
ages on the surface of clothing and accessories.99 
 
-carlson-0 (describing the launch of designer Miriam Cecelia Carlson‘s line 
m.c.c. and Carlson‘s use of the mineral mica in her designs).  
 93. Julie Tsai, Note, Fashioning Protection: A Note on the Protection of 
Fashion Designs in the United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 447, 450 
(2005). 
 94. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (2006); see Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover 
Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).  
 95. See, e.g., Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie‘s Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 
(2d Cir. 1989); cf. The Industry Speaks Out, supra note 25 (musing that ―the 
bestower of patents—who clearly missed McQueen‘s fall 2006 giant gauze-
wrapped deer antler headdress—deems clothing ‗useful articles,‘ not works of 
art‖). 
 96. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5667, 5668 (―[A]lthough the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetical-
ly satisfying and valuable, the Committee‘s intention is not to offer it copy-
right protection under the bill. Unless the shape of a[ ] . . . ladies‘ 
dress . . . contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identi-
fied as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would 
not be copyrighted under the bill.‖).  
 97. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880); 
Publications Int‘l Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996); 
Condotti, Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 412, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
 98. E.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 
1995); see, e.g., Hamil America, Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1999).  
 99. E.g., Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills Inc., 519 F. Supp. 
730, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see, e.g., Malden Mills, Inc. v. Regency Mills, Inc., 
626 F.2d 1112 (2d Cir. 1980).  
 2011] FASHION PIRACY 349 
 
Protections for fashion designs slip through the cracks de-
spite the plethora of potential copyright shields available to the 
fashion industry, leaving designers vulnerable to copyists.100 In 
response to this concern, fashion industry members have cam-
paigned for fashion design legislation for years, culminating in 
the legislation currently pending in Congress.101 
C. FASHION DESIGN LEGISLATION 
Congress has considered over 70 bills since 1914 to provide 
some sort of protection against fashion design piracy, but no 
bill has yet been passed.102 In recent years, there has been a 
new surge of legislative activity for fashion design protection.103 
The evolution of these bills illustrates the concerns that propo-
nents and critics have had with the idea of fashion design pro-
tection. 
On March 30, 2006, Representative Bob Goodlatte intro-
duced the first version of the Design Piracy and Protection Act 
(DPPA) in the House of Representatives.104 Despite support by 
prominent designers and the Council of Fashion Designers of 
America (CFDA), the bill faced opposition, most notably from 
the American Apparel & Footwear Association (AAFA), and 
stalled in committee.105 A second version of the DPPA was rein-
troduced by Representative William Delahunt on April 25, 
2007.106 In the Senate, Senator Charles Schumer introduced 
the Senate version for the bill on August 2, 2007.107 Neither 
version reached a vote.108 The most recent DPPA was reintro-
 
 100. Laura C. Marshall, Note, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should 
Adopt a Modified Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 305, 308–09 (2007). 
 101. Susan Scafidi, IDPPPA: Introducing the Innovative Design Protection 
and Piracy Prevention Act, a.k.a. Fashion Copyright, COUNTERFEIT CHIC (Aug. 
6, 2010), http://counterfeitchic.com/2010/08/introducing-the-innovative-design 
-protection-and-piracy-prevention-act.html. 
 102. Marshall, supra note 100, at 314–15. 
 103. A Bill to Provide Protection for Fashion Design: Hearing on H.R. 5055 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–3 (2006) (statement of the United 
States Copyright Office). 
 104. H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2006); Anya Jenkins Ferris, Note, Real Art 
Calls for Real Legislation: An Argument Against Adoption of the Design Piracy 
Prohibition Act, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 559, 567 (2008). 
 105. See Ferris, supra note 104 (indicating that no vote was taken); Scafidi, 
supra note 101; The Industry Speaks Out, supra note 25.  
 106. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 107. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, S. 1957, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 108. Id.; H.R. 2033. 
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duced in the house by Representative Delahunt on April 30, 
2009,109 and on August 5, 2010 Senator Schumer introduced 
the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act 
(IDPPPA) in the Senate, which received support from both the 
CFDA and the AAFA.110 The IDPPPA passed the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on December 6, 2010 and later died in 
committee.111 On July 13, 2011, Representative Robert Good-
latte introduced the Innovative Design Protection and Piracy 
Prevention Act in the House, and it was subsequently referred 
to the House Committee on the Judiciary, and later referred to 
the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property, Competition and 
the Internet.112 The IDPPPA may be reintroduced in the Senate 
this year. 
1. The Design Piracy Prohibition Act 
The DPPA would amend Title 17 of the United States Code 
to extend protection to fashion designs.113 Instead of a direct 
amendment to the copyright act, the bill proposes an amend-
ment to § 1301, which provides sui generis protection only for 
certain facets of watercrafts.114 ―Fashion design‖ is defined as 
―the appearance as a whole of an article of apparel, including 
its ornamentation‖ and ―original elements . . . or the original 
arrangement . . . of . . . non-original elements‖ in ―the article of 
apparel.‖115 The term ―apparel‖ is defined rather broadly, in-
cluding, in addition to clothing, ―gloves, footwear, and head-
gear; handbags, purses, wallets, duffel bags, suitcases, tote 
bags, and belts; and eyeglass frames.‖116 To qualify for a three-
year term of protection under the DPPA,117 the designer must 
apply for registration ―within 6 months after the date on which 
 
 109. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 110. Innovative Design Protection and Prevention Act, S. 3728, 111th 
Cong. (2010); Scafidi, supra note 101. 
 111. S. 3728. 
 112. Innovative Design Protection and Prevention Act, H.R. 2511, 112th 
Cong. (2011).  
 113. H.R. 2196. 
 114. 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006); H.R. 2196; see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 472 (5th ed. 2010) 
(explaining that Congress has passed two design protection statutes, the Sem-
iconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 (17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14) and the Vessel 
Hull Design Protection Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–32), that ―create sui generis 
forms of legal protection to fill in gaps in the intellectual property landscape‖). 
 115. H.R. 2196 § 2(a)(7).  
 116. Id. § 2(a)(9). 
 117. Id. § 2(d)(a)(2). 
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the design is first made public‖118 The DPPA also includes a 
public, computerized database containing visual representa-
tions and information for all of the registered fashion de-
signs.119 
An act of infringement occurs when a protected fashion de-
sign, or an image of the design, is copied ―without the consent 
of the owner of the protected design.‖120 However, there is no 
infringement under the DPPA if the allegedly copied design is: 
(1) ―original and not closely and substantially similar in overall 
visual appearance to a protected design,‖ (2) ―merely re-
flect[ing] a trend,‖ or (3) ―the result of independent creation.‖121 
The DPPA sets the maximum damages at the greater of 
―$250,000 or $5 per copy.‖122 Thus, the defining features of the 
DPPA are the ―closely and substantially similar‖ standard, the 
proposed searchable fashion design database, and the three-
year term of protection. 
2. The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention 
Act 
Like its predecessor, the IDPPPA would amend § 1301 of 
the Copyright Act to extend protection to fashion designs.123 
The IDPPPA limits the term ―Fashion design‖ to the original 
elements or arrangements of the article of apparel to those that 
―are the result of a designer‘s own creative endeavor; and pro-
vide a unique, distinguishable, nontrivial and nonutilitarian 
variation over prior designs for similar types of articles.‖124 The 
IDPPPA defines ―apparel‖ nearly identically to the definition in 
the DPPA.125 The IDPPPA also provides for the same three-
year term of protection as the DPPA.126  
However, the IDPPPA also differs from the DPPA in many 
respects. Most notably, there is no registration requirement 
 
 118. Id. § 2(f ). 
 119. Id. § 2( j). 
 120. Id. § 2(e)(1).  
 121. Id. § 2(e)(3). The term ―trend‖ is defined in § 2(a)(10) as ―a newly popu-
lar concept, idea, or principle expressed in, or as part of, a wide variety of de-
signs of articles of apparel that create an immediate amplified demand for ar-
ticles of apparel embodying that concept, idea, or principle.‖ 
 122. Id. § 2(g). 
 123. S. 3728, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010). 
 124. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(7)(B). 
 125. Compare id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(9), with H.R. 2196 § 2(a)(9).  
 126. S. 3728 § 2(d)(a)(2); see also H.R. 2196 § 2(d)(a)(2).  
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under the IDPPPA,127 and consequently, no searchable data-
base.128 In the IDPPPA, a design is not an infringing article if 
the design (1) ―is not substantially identical in overall visual 
appearance to and as to the original elements of a protected de-
sign,‖ (2) ―is the result of independent creation,‖ or (3) if the 
home sewing exception applies.129 This heightened standard of 
―substantially identical‖ requires a claimant to show that an 
article of apparel ―is so similar in appearance as to be likely to 
be mistaken for the protected design, and contains only those 
differences in construction or design which are merely trivi-
al.‖130 The pleading requirements of the IDPPPA specify that 
the claimant must establish that (1) plaintiff ‘s design is pro-
tected, (2) defendant‘s design is infringing, and (3) ―it can be 
reasonably inferred from the totality of the surrounding facts 
and circumstances‖ that the defendant knew of the protected 
design.131 Damages under the IDPPPA are much less than 
those under the DPPA because the senate bill limits damages 
to the greater of $50,000 or $1 per copy.132 Also, the IDPPPA 
increases the penalties for false representation.133  
In consideration of the unique facets of the fashion indus-
try, the ongoing problem of fashion piracy, and the current in-
tellectual property protections available to designers, the pro-
posed legislation can be thoughtfully analyzed. After ―eighty-
nine failed attempts to increase IP protection for the fashion 
industry,‖134 discussion of fashion design piracy has evolved in-
to a fervent debate, dividing designers, scholars, and industry 
stakeholders into two camps: those in favor of the fashion de-
sign legislation and those opposed to the fashion design  
legislation.135  
 
 127. S. 3728 § 2(f )(2). 
 128. Compare id., with H.R. 2196 § 2( j). 
 129. S. 3728 § 2(e)(2)(e)(3). 
 130. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B)(10).  
 131. Id. § 2(g)(2)(e)(1).  
 132. See 17 U.S.C. § 1323 (2006). Compare id., with H.R. 2196 § 2(a).  
 133. S. 3728 § 2(h). 
 134. Alissandra Burack, Comment, Is Fashion an Art Form that Should be 
Protected or Merely a Constantly Changing Media Encouraging Replication of 
Popular Trends?, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 605, 619 (2010). 
 135. Compare Marshall, supra note 100, at 322–26 (urging Congress to 
adopt modified design protection), with Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10 
(arguing that ―[t]he fashion industry flourishes despite a near-total lack of 
protection for its core product, fashion designs‖). 
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II.  DRESS WARS: ANALYZING THE FASHION DESIGN 
DEBATE   
This Part summarizes opposing views on protection of  
fashion designs. It considers the philosophical motivations, 
economic justifications, and pragmatic concerns, from both the 
perspective of the proponents and the critics. The current dis-
cussion echoes the historical debate following the Supreme 
Court‘s 1941 decision in Fashion Originators’ Guild of America 
v. Federal Trade Commission136 that provoked Guild leader 
Maurice Rentner to lobby Congress to grant copyright protec-
tions for designers, claiming that ―a failure to do so would put 
the fashion business in mortal danger.‖137 In 1947, department 
store owner Leon Bendel Schmulen countered in The New York 
Times ―that copying was ‗no danger to the business‘ and a ‗nat-
ural consequence of fashion.‘‖138 The debate on whether fashion 
is in danger continues with the current sui generis copyright 
proposals.  
A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXPANDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT TO 
INCLUDE FASHION DESIGN 
Proponents of intellectual property protection for fashion 
design have supported direct amendments to the copyright 
act,139 trade dress protection,140 and various forms of sui generis 
copyright protection.141 While their conceptions of the ideal so-
lution may differ, there are many arguments in common, in-
cluding an interest in moral rights, efforts for international 
consistency, a parallel to architecture, and concern for the 
plight of emerging designers.  
 
 136. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
 137. Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Is the Design Piracy Prohibition Act 
a Good Idea?, FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www 
.freakonomics.com/2010/03/12/should-fashion-be-protected-by-copyright-laws-a 
-guest-post/.  
 138. Id.  
 139. See, e.g., Kristin L. Black, Note, Crimes of Fashion: Is Imitation Truly 
the Sincerest Form of Flattery?, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 505, 516–18 (2010); 
Ferris, supra note 104.  
 140. See, e.g., N. Elizabeth Mills, Intellectual Property Protection for Fa-
shion Design: An Overview of Existing Law and a Look Toward Proposed Leg-
islative Changes, 5 SHIDLER J.L. COM. & TECH. 24, para. 8 (2009).  
 141. E.g., Irene Tan, Comment, Knock it off, Forever 21! The Fashion In-
dustry’s Battle Against Design Piracy, 18 J.L. & POL‘Y 893, 921–24 (2010). 
 354 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:336 
 
1. Moral Rights: Fashion Designers Are Artists  
At the root of nearly all of the arguments in favor of fa-
shion design legislation is a concern for fairness. Although the 
law makes a clear distinction between knockoffs and counter-
feits,142 proponents claim that design piracy is no different than 
―counterfeiting without the label.‖143 They believe that fashion 
design creations are art—even if they have functional aspects—
and deserve protection like paintings, music, and sculpture.144 
For example, museums around the world display couture gar-
ments.145 Proponents identify the ―growing acceptance of fash-
ion designs as works of art‖ as an indication that designers are 
artists, worthy of the protections afforded by authorship sta-
tus.146  
Legal scholars Hansmann and Santilla identify  
four distinct rights that are commonly referred to collectively as au-
thors‘ and artists‘ ―moral rights‖: the right of integrity, under which 
the artist can prevent alterations in his work; the right of attribution 
or paternity, under which the artist can insist that his work be distri-
buted or displayed only if his name is connected with it; the right of 
disclosure, under which the artist can refuse to expose his work to the 
public before he feels it is satisfactory; and the right of retraction or 
withdrawal, under which the artist can withdraw his work even after 
it has left his hands.147 
Although the United States generally does not recognize moral 
rights,148 Congress enacted the Visual Artists Rights Act (VA-
RA) in 1990, indicating a willingness to consider a moral rights 
perspective.149 VARA protects the rights of integrity and attri-
bution for visual artists.150 With this concern for the artist be-
hind the dress, many proponents look to Europe, where moral 
rights have a greater presence than in the United States.151 
 
 142. Jimenez, supra note 3, at 16. 
 143. Reasons to Stop Fashion Piracy, STOP FASHION PIRACY, http://www 
.stopfashionpiracy.com/ ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
 144. Tsai, supra note 93, at 461–63; The Industry Speaks Out, supra note 25.  
 145. E.g., Sara R. Ellis, Note, Copyrighting Couture: An Examination of 
Fashion Design Protection and Why the DPPA and IDPPPA Are a Step To-
wards the Solution to Counterfeit Chic, 78 TENN. L. REV. 163, 187 (2010); Tsai, 
supra note 93, at 461.  
 146. Ellis, supra note 145, at 186–87.  
 147. Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 14, at 96.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), Pub. L. No. 101-650 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered §§ of 17 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 150. 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 151. See Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 14, at 97. 
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2. The United States Should Follow International Models  
Proponents contend that a lack of design protection pre-
vents American designers from reaping the rewards of their 
work and places them at a disadvantage in the global market-
place.152 They believe that the United States should follow the 
legal frameworks in other countries, which convey a greater 
appreciation for fashion.153 Countries with vibrant fashion in-
dustries—such as France,154 Japan,155 and Italy156—provide le-
gal protection for fashion designs. Even beyond the typical  
fashion circuit, countries like India protect the intellectual 
property of their fashion designers.157 In Europe, fashion de-
signers enjoy both protection by national laws and protection 
by the individual European countries and the European Direc-
tive on the Legal Protection of designs (E.U. Directive).158 
French designers have been protected since 1793 under the 
―doctrine of the unity of art.‖159 With the strongest legal protec-
tion for fashion designs in the world, France subjects copyright 
infringers to both civil suits for damages and criminal penal-
ties, including a fine of 300,000 Euros and up to three years in 
jail for infringement.160 Compared to other countries in the 
 
 152. See The Industry Speaks Out, supra note 25.  
 153. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 100, at 322–24.  
 154. See Loi 94-361 du 10 mai 1994 art. L112-2 [Law 94-361 of May 10, 
1994, art. 112-2], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 11, 1994, p. 6863, unofficial translation 
available at http:// natlawip.abra.info/european/france/frenchlegislation/prfr7.htm 
(including ―articles of fashion‖ in the copyright act). 
 155. See Isho Ho [Design Law], Law No. 125 of 1959, art. 3 (Japan), trans-
lated in 6 EHS LAW BULL. SER. no. 6875A (2005), translation available at 
http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/DACT.pdf. 
 156. See Emily S. Day, Double-Edged Scissor: Legal Protection for Fashion 
Design, 86 N.C. L. REV. 237, 267 (2007) (quoting Alberto Musso & Mario Fa-
biam, Italy, in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 2(4)(C) (Paul 
Edward Gellar ed., 2006)) (―Finally, Italian copyright law extends protection to 
‗works of industrial design displaying creative character and per se artistic 
value.‘‖). 
 157. See The Designs Act, No. 16 of 2000, INDIA CODE (2000), translation 
available at http://indiacode.nic.in/ (search for ―Designs Act‖); see also Biana 
Borukhovich, Note, Fashion Design: The Work of Art That is Still Unrecog-
nized in the United States, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 155, 166–67 
(2009). 
 158. Council Directive 98/71, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28 (EC).  
 159. See Borukhovich, supra note 157, at 167; see also Scafidi, supra note 
30, at 117. 
 160. See Borukhovich, supra note 157, at 168. 
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global market, there is a considerable gap in United States 
copyright protection.161  
3. Fashion Design Should Parallel the Architectural Works 
Copyright Protection Act 
Proponents of expanding protection to fashion design also 
draw a parallel to architecture copyrights.162 Until 1990, archi-
tectural buildings, unlike blueprints, had little protection: the 
physical structures could be copied, but architectural plans 
were protected.163 In 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed 
into law the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, 
which expanded the subject matter of the Copyright Act to in-
clude ―architectural works.‖164 Even though architectural de-
signs are not physically separable from architectural works, 
this new category ―does not implicate the ‗physical or concep-
tual separability‘ conundrum that bedevils protection for useful 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural (PGS) works.‖165 Proponents 
may be attracted to this more direct route because the sui ge-
neris amendment appears like a ―second class‖ copyright and 
they think fashion design is worthy of full copyright protection 
under § 102 of the Copyright Act.  
 
 161. See Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 84 (2006) [hereinafter Scafidi Statement] (writ-
ten statement of Susan Scafidi, Professor) (―The global legal trend toward  
fashion design protection has rendered the U.S. an outlier among nations that 
actively support intellectual property protection, a position that is both politi-
cally inconsistent and contrary to the economic health of the domestic fashion 
industry.‖).  
 162. E.g., Kristin L. Black, Note, Crimes of Fashion: Is Imitation Truly the 
Sincerest Form of Flattery?, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 505, 508 (2010); Bran-
don Scruggs, Note, Should Fashion Design Be Copyrightable?, 6 NW. J. TECH. 
& INTELL. PROP. 122, 127 (2007).  
 163. See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp. 658, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(holding that traced blueprints infringed the originals, but that the construc-
tion of an identical building would not violate a copyright in blueprints). 
 164. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2006); see also Id. § 101 (defining ―architectural 
works‖ as ―the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings‖ and including 
―the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and 
elements in the design‖ as protected elements of the work).  
 165. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 2.20[A] (2011). 
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4. Barriers to Entry: Designers Are Harmed 
Piracy creates an obstacle in the path of new designers in 
particular.166 Since knockoffs can enter the market faster, the 
consumer sees the copy before the original, creating confu-
sion.167 Even if the consumer is not fooled by the knockoff, oth-
er consumers may be confused under the doctrine of post-sale 
confusion.168 When a pirate creates a knockoff of a designer‘s 
work, the designer has economic loss from the lack of profits.169 
As a result, the designer is economically hurt as the knockoffs 
replace sales and demand for the original garment declines.170 
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPANDING THE COPYRIGHT ACT TO 
INCLUDE FASHION DESIGN 
The Piracy Paradox, with its economic approach to fashion 
piracy, is the most prominent voice of opposition in the de-
bate.171 Critics contend that the pending legislation has great 
potential to negatively affect the multifaceted fashion industry, 
namely fashion designers, consumers, the courts, and other 
creative fields.172 
1. Utilitarian Theory 
In the United States, intellectual property rights are pre-
mised on a utilitarian theory rather than a natural rights 
 
 166. Binkley, supra note 4. 
 167. E.g., Sara R. Ellis, supra note 145, at 188–90. 
 168. See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 851 (2010) (“This doctrine holds that even if consumers 
are not confused at the point of sale as to the true source of the goods that they 
are purchasing, other consumers may be confused as to the source of those 
goods after the sale.‖).  
 169. E.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) (statement of Jeffrey Banks, Fashion 
Designer) (describing how fashion design piracy ―robs American [designers] of 
their livelihood‖). 
 170. E.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Eco-
nomics of Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1176 (2009). 
 171. Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Response, The Piracy Para-
dox Revisited, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1201 (2009); Kal Raustiala & Christopher 
Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fash-
ion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). 
 172. E.g., Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13–14 (2006) [hereinafter Wolfe Testimony] (tes-
timony of David Wolfe, Creative Director, The Doneger Group). 
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theory.173 The Constitution grants Congress the power ―to pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.‖174 Tension arises 
between a utilitarian approach, prioritizing society before indi-
vidual, and a moral rights approach, prioritizing the individu-
al.175 Under a utilitarian perspective, critics of the proposed 
legislation view isolated cases of fashion piracy as unnecessary 
reasons to change a thriving industry.176 
2. The Proposed Bill Will Harm Stakeholders 
Critics claim that the fashion industry is thriving without 
protection for fashion design and this bill will upset the rituals 
and synchronized rhythm of the field.177 Many critics believe 
―there would be no fashion‖ with fashion design copyright 
laws.178 They contend that a sui generis amendment to the cop-
yright act would create more harm to designers, consumers, 
and courts than any potential benefits of a fashion design copy-
right.  
First, the bill will negatively affect fashion designers from 
established couture houses to young designers launching out of 
Parsons to Faviana knockoff designers.179 Trends create jobs, 
whereas a copyright monopoly on a style will prevent other de-
signers from capitalizing on the idea.180 The knockoff houses 
 
 173. See Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 
HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 65 (1997) (―Society seeks to maximize utility in the form 
of scientific and cultural progress by granting rights to authors and inventors 
as an incentive toward such progress.‖).  
 174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
 175. Moore, supra note 173, at 66. 
 176. See, e.g., Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1727–28. 
 177. Id. at 1691. Cf. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & U.S. DEP‘T OF 
LABOR, Fashion Designers, in OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 309 
(2010–11 ed.), available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos291.htm (―Employment 
of fashion designers is projected to grow by 1 percent between 2008 and 
2018.‖). 
 178. Videotape: The Ecology of Creativity in Fashion (The Norman Lear 
Center 2005), available at http://www.learcenter.org/html/projects/?&cm=ccc/ 
fashionsched; see also Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172 (comparing the fashion 
industry to a balanced ecosystem of an ocean reef to emphasize the symbiotic 
elements of originality, creativity, and copying). 
 179. See Lynsey Blackmon, Note, The Devil Wears Prado: A Look at the Ex-
tension of Copyright Protection to the World of Fashion, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 107, 
141–43 (2007); Ferris, supra note 104, at 559.  
 180. See Blackmon, supra note 179, at 142–43; see also Wolfe Testimony, 
supra note 172, at 16–19. 
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will suffer in particular, but job losses will occur throughout the 
industry because designers at every level engage in some de-
gree of copying.181 Litigation will require designers to spend 
more time in court and less time creating.182 Designers will 
need to spend time and money enforcing their copyrights, and 
they will likely argue over whether copying occurred in the first 
place.183 Because of these hidden costs in the proposed legisla-
tion, critics contend that it will likely have a disproportionate 
impact on small fashion companies and emerging designers.184  
Second, the negative effects on designers will trickle down 
to hurt consumers.185 If the bill is passed, fashion companies 
will need to adjust for the increased costs of litigation and filing 
expenses, and they will likely pass these new costs on to con-
sumers.186 In short, the cost of clothing will go up.187 If copycat 
designers are prevented from replicating couture styles, the va-
riety in clothing will go down, and stylish clothing will be less 
accessible.188 
Third, the bill will burden the courts through excessive lit-
igation over an ambiguous standard.189 The substantially simi-
lar, identical standard is problematic. Even after many tries at 
creating the bill, the language is still too vague; the standard of 
―substantially identical‖ will be time consuming and difficult 
for the courts to determine. The courts lack the expertise to de-
cide disputes over imitation in fashion.190 To the average judge, 
two garments may look alike, but to industry insiders, they 
may see two entirely different pieces. 
 
 181. See Blackmon, supra note 179, at 142–43. 
 182. See Ferris, supra note 104, at 584. 
 183. See Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172, at 16–20. 
 184. See Ferris, supra note 104, at 584. 
 185. See Blackmon, supra note 179, at 145–46. 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 87–89 (2006) (outlining the prepared statement 
of Christopher Sprigman); Staci Riordan, The “Destruction of Affordable Fash-
ion Bill” Or IDPPPA Gets One Step Closer to Becoming Fashion Law,  
FASHION L. BLOG: AN INTERACTIVE DISCUSSION OF THE BUSINESS OF FASHION 
(Dec. 2, 2010), http://fashionlaw.foxrothschild.com/2010/12/articles/design-piracy 
-prohibition-act/the-destruction-of-affordable-fashion-bill-or-idpppa-gets-one-step 
-closer-to-becoming-fashion-law/. 
 188. See Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172, at 19–20. 
 189. See Blackmon, supra note 179, at 144–45. 
 190. See Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172, at 19–20. 
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Fourth, critics warn that the proposed legislation will be a 
slippery slope. The debate on whether to adopt fashion design 
legislation is much larger than fashion because it stems from 
the philosophical perspectives underlying intellectual property 
law. The outcome of the debate has the potential of making 
significant waves across various other arguably underprotected 
fields, such as magic tricks,191 stand-up comedy,192 hairstyles, 
tattoos,193 and cuisine.194 
3. The Piracy Paradox: Knockoffs Benefit the Fashion 
Industry  
In a traditional intellectual property system, the incentive 
thesis ―predicts that, absent intellectual property protection 
against third-party appropriation of sale proceeds, manufactur-
ers and creators will limit or cease investment.‖195 Although the 
presence of knockoffs is rapidly increasing, the American fash-
ion industry has not been harmed by the lack of design copy-
right—in fact it has thrived.196 Unlike the traditional model, 
knockoff fashion designs have not harmed designers by taking 
away a considerable amount of sales.197 Raustiala and Sprig-
man use the phrase ―low-IP equilibrium‖ to suggest ―that the 
three core forms of IP law—copyright, trademark, and patent—
provide only very limited protection for fashion designs, and yet 
this low level of legal protection is politically stable.‖198 Fashion 
does not adhere to the orthodox understanding of IP law in 
which piracy is a ―fatal threat to the incentive to engage in crea-
tive labor,‖199 but instead ―the lack of design protection in fash-
ion is not especially harmful to fashion innovators, and hence 
 
 191. See Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed: Protecting Magicians’ Intellectual 
Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123, 
123–24 (Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010).  
 192. See Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (An-
ymore): The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation 
of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787, 1789–92 (2008). 
 193. Thomas F. Cotter & Angela M. Mirabole, Written on the Body: Intellec-
tual Property Rights in Tattoos, Makeup, and Other Body Art, 10 UCLA ENT. 
L. REV. 97, 99–102 (2003).  
 194. Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual 
Property Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187, 188 (2008).  
 195. Barnett, supra note 45, at 1381–82. 
 196. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 171, at 1212–13; Ferris, supra note 
104, at 579.  
 197. Ferris, supra note 104, at 580.  
 198. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1699. 
 199. Id. at 1717. 
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they are not incentivized to change it.‖200 Barnett offers an ex-
planation, hypothesizing that the presence of the knockoffs al-
lows the designers to charge a ―snob premium‖ for the original 
and popularizes the trend.201  
Raustiala and Sprigman offer an alternative explanation 
for why knockoffs benefit the fashion community: the piracy 
paradox, which rests on two principles.202 First, induced obso-
lescence is the process by which ―IP rules providing for free ap-
propriation of fashion designs accelerate the diffusion of de-
signs and styles.‖203 Second, anchoring occurs when ―readily 
discernible trends nonetheless emerge and come to define a 
particular season‘s style,‖204 which ultimately drives consump-
tion. The ―piracy paradox‖ is the notion that ―copying fails to 
deter innovation in the fashion industry because, counter-
intuitively, copying is not very harmful to originators 
[and] . . . may actually promote innovation and benefit origina-
tors.‖205 The term ―piracy paradox‖ refers to the manner in 
which copying ―generate[s] more demand for new designs, since 
the old designs—the ones that have been copied—are no longer 
special‖ and results in ―greater sales of apparel.‖206 Knockoffs 
help drive the trend, which increases the value of the original 
and urges designers to innovate.207 Knockoffs also make de-
signs more affordable, so more people can wear them because 
―Vera Wang and Allen B. Schwartz aren‘t selling to the same 
crowds.‖208 Finally, it spurs more innovation because designers 
have to stay ahead of copycats.209  
From a creative perspective, the lack of legal protection for 
fashion design has resulted in a rich bricolage that allows for 
―constant mixing and morphing of incongruous ‗found‘ elements 
into a new synthesis.‖210 Articulating the culture of copying 
among designers, fashion writer Holly Brubach once wrote, 
 
 200. Id. at 1718. 
 201. Barnett, supra note 45, at 1385. 
 202. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 10, at 1687. 
 203. Id. at 1722. 
 204. Id. at 1728. 
 205. Id. at 1691. 
 206. Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 137. 
 207. Ezra Klein, Copycats vs. Copyrights, THE DAILY BEAST, NEWSWEEK 
ONLINE (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/08/20/ 
copycats-versus-copyrights.html.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
 210. BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 18, at 4.  
 362 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:336 
 
―Fashion is one of the means by which we dream collective-
ly.‖211 Reflecting on the importance of appropriation, designer 
Tom Ford once said, ―You couldn‘t design without [appropria-
tion]—I mean, none of us invented the sleeve. We have two 
arms. You need two sleeves.‖212 The Piracy Paradox explains 
both the economic and creative success in the fashion industry 
amidst rampant copying. 
III.  TAILORING A SOLUTION TO FIT FASHION DESIGN   
The proponents and critics of the legislation present 
thoughtful arguments for the fashion design community, yet 
there are significant concerns about either adopting proposed 
legislation or maintaining the status quo.213 A solution that ac-
knowledges the importance of attribution will address the con-
cerns of the fashion design community, without creating more 
harm to stakeholders. The next Sections evaluate both sides of 
the debate on whether the proposed legislation is necessary, 
and propose a solution to protect attribution rights and to as-
sure authenticity of original designs through certification and 
collective marks.  
A. BOTH ARGUMENTS ARE FLAWED 
While both sides of the debate present important concerns, 
neither side‘s solution fully responds to the unique nature of 
the fashion design community. The proponents of sui generis 
protection advocate for an expansion of intellectual property 
rights to fashion that is dangerously broad. On the other hand, 
critics recognize the benefits of copying, but fail to see the value 
in protecting the moral rights of fashion designers.  
1. Proponents Fail to Consider the Risks of Sui Generis 
Protection 
Proponents of expanding the Copyright Act to include fash-
ion design fail to consider three main concerns. First, adopting 
a fashion design copyright could create oppressive monopolies 
in the fashion community that would put an end to creativity 
for emerging designers and interrupt the delicate balance of 
 
 211. Id. at 19.  
 212. Tom Ford, Former Creative Dir., Gucci, Remarks at Ready to Share: 
Fashion & the Ownership of Creativity 45 (Jan. 29, 2005), available at http:// 
www.learcenter.org/pdf/RTStranscript.pdf. 
 213. See supra Part II. 
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innovation.214 Second, the ―substantially identical‖ standard 
will be difficult for courts to apply and will most likely result in 
frivolous litigation, increased costs for consumers, and fewer 
clothing styles on the market. And third, the negative impact 
would likely spread beyond fashion to result in a slippery slope 
problem for other creative industries. 
Architecture provides the best analogy for a fashion design 
amendment to the Copyright Act, but there are pragmatic is-
sues that would make a direct amendment highly unlikely. 
There is a disparity in volume—the apparel industry is consi-
derably larger than that of architecture. Unlike architecture, 
the life of a fashion design is transitory. The artistic and func-
tional elements are more easily separated in a building than a 
garment because a building may have an ornate exterior and a 
functional purpose inside. These differences chip away at the 
parallel and illustrate why fashion design does not fit neatly in-
to the copyright act.  
Compared to the rest of the world, the U.S. copyright sys-
tem appears to have a major gap, but the proponents of the bill 
ignore the evolution of U.S. copyright law in favor of attractive 
models across the pond. The moral rights argument has merit, 
but it is problematic in light of the utilitarian system in the 
United States. Implementing a gradual form of moral rights, in 
line with VARA, would be more realistic than attempting to 
copy the French copyright system. Proponents of the bill as-
tutely identify the significant concerns of the emerging design-
er who is cut out of the fashion cycle, but they champion the 
wrong solution.  
In sum, the proposed sui generis copyright protection for 
fashion designs is not a good solution for the knockoff dilemma 
because the costs outweigh the benefits. While the proponents 
are motivated by valid concerns for moral rights, the expansion 
will be problematic on multiple levels. First, the judicial system 
is not the best option for policing copying because the standard 
is difficult to apply and industry insiders will be better judges. 
Second, although the proponents make a strong argument for 
moral rights, the U.S. copyright system has an inherently utili-
tarian perspective that cannot be overlooked. Third, when ana-
lyzing the unique fashion design industry as a whole, there is 
no economic justification for a fashion design copyright.  
 
 214. See COX & JENKINS, supra note 84, at 6.  
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2. Critics Fail to Consider Moral Rights 
The critics aptly identify serious costs that would result 
from the proposed legislation, and they recognize the unique 
nature of fashion and the benefits of imitation and remix in the 
fashion world.215 While the economic explanation proves wise, 
it focuses on the large fashion designers, not the emerging de-
signers. Vera Wang is barely harmed if Allen B. Schwartz cop-
ies her bridal gowns, but the young scarf designer Sakellis is 
economically and morally harmed if her scarf design is co-
pied.216 The critics fail to acknowledge the considerable in-
fringement of moral rights in the context of emerging design-
ers. While the U.S. intellectual property system is founded on 
utilitarian motives, intangible motives play a large part in the 
fashion design community.217 Designers are concerned about 
their moral rights and the solution should reflect those  
concerns.  
B. PROPOSAL: BALANCING MORAL RIGHTS AND CREATIVE 
FREEDOM 
From within the fashion design debate emerges a convinc-
ing economic analysis from the critics and a significant concern 
for emerging designers from the proponents. The proposed leg-
islation is not the best solution because it fails to reconcile 
these competing concerns. Instead of relying on the Copyright 
Act, proponents should shift their attention to trademark law—
―the most universally applicable and flexible mechanism of the 
protection of fashion design.‖218 
In general, copying in the fashion industry has beneficial 
effects, but there are situations where individual designers are 
hurt from copying. A solution that allows for copying but still 
recognizes the moral rights of designers will allow fashion de-
sign to continue to flourish, while recognizing the sincere con-
cerns of the huge industry. While the costs of expanding the 
Copyright Act outweigh the benefits, carving out protection for 
the moral rights of fashion designers in the trademark act will 
benefit all fashion stakeholders.  
 
 215. Wolfe Testimony, supra note 172, at 19–20. 
 216. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 207. 
 217. See, e.g., Scafidi Statement, supra note 161, at 79. 
 218. Scafidi, supra note 30. 
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1. The Right of Attribution 
When celebrities walk down the red carpet, reporters rou-
tinely ask, ―Who are you wearing?‖ Fashion designs are inti-
mately connected with the designer, even if there are no logos. 
There are both intangible and tangible concerns related to pro-
tecting the designer‘s name. Many designers create for the love 
of fashion and design, seeking only the reward of notoriety and 
a positive review in Women’s Wear Daily. In a fast-paced indus-
try that rides trends, reputation and recognition is very  
significant.  
Among the four well-known moral rights,219 attribution 
stands out as an ideal choice for fashion designers because it 
would not upset the system and it would achieve the goal of 
protecting the name of the designer. It would be impractical to 
apply a right of integrity to fashion design because consumers 
alter and tailor clothing to achieve a good fit.220 Similarly, the 
right of disclosure would not make sense since fashion is in-
tended to be visible and worn in public. The right to withdraw 
is likewise inapplicable because of the public and functional as-
pects of apparel. Compared to the other moral rights, the right 
of attribution—the artists‘ right to insist that her name contin-
ue to be associated with work she has produced and to insist 
that her name not be used on work she has not in fact pro-
duced—responds to the concern for emerging designers, and it 
would not radically change the current U.S. intellectual proper-
ty regime.  
A right of attribution specifically addresses the needs of  
fashion designers. In working on a collection, a designer must 
carefully mold her reputation and brand identity so the line 
communicates a unique source and authentic story.221 
Throughout history designers have sought to protect their at-
tribution rights in their collections. In the 1920s and 1930s, de-
signers sought to create marks of authenticity, such as the 
thumbprint labels in Madeleine Vionnet‘s atelier.222 Likewise, 
the period of logomania in the 1980s was an effort to guard 
 
 219. See, e.g., Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 14, at 95–96.  
 220. Cf. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, Sept. 9, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, art. 6bis., 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 
(stating that the author shall have the right ―to object to any distortion, muti-
lation, or other modification‖ of the work).  
 221. E.g., BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 18, at 23 (―Designers have credi-
bility, stature and profitability because their name comes to represent a look 
and an artistic standard.‖).  
 222. See Scafidi, supra note 30, at 124. 
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garments through trademark law by adorning apparel with an 
abundance of exterior labels.223 These historical efforts under-
line the significance of attribution in the fashion design industry.  
2. Fashion Mark Mechanism 
A certification mark or collective mark would allow design-
ers to opt in for protection of their moral rights without drasti-
cally changing the intellectual property regime. The Lanham 
Act provides for two types of marks that have not traditionally 
been used to protect fashion designs, but may solve the dilem-
ma of source identification, without interrupting the copying 
dynamic.224  
A certification mark is most often used by trade associa-
tions or other organizations ―to identify a certain type of prod-
uct.‖225 For example, the ―Underwriters Laboratory‖ or ―UL‖ 
mark shows that a product meets specific safety standards,226 
and the ―Roquefort‖ mark indicates that cheese has been manu-
factured in a specific region of France and according to a par-
ticular process.227 Thus, ―a certification mark is symbolic of a 
guarantee or the meeting of certain standards.‖228 A mark may 
be registered as a certification mark, another subset of trade-
mark law, pursuant to § 4 of the Lanham Act,229 and courts 
have found that common law certification marks can be pro-
tected without registration.230 
Another subset of trademark law, the collective mark, 
symbolizes membership in a group or organization.231 For ex-
ample, the mark ―CPA‖ indicates membership in the Society of 
Certified Public Accountants.232 Unlike trademarks, the collec-
 
 223. See id. at 120.  
 224. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Midwest Plastic Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 906 
F.2d 1568, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
 227. Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d 494, 496 (2d 
Cir. 1962). 
 228. MCCARTHY, supra note 62, § 4:16. 
 229. 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006). 
 230. E.g., Institut National Des Appellations d‘Origine v. Brown-Forman 
Corp., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1875, 1885 (T.T.A.B. 1998) (―[T ]he term ‗Cognac‘ is rec-
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origin.‖).  
 231. MCCARTHY, supra note 62, § 4:16. 
 232. See generally AICPA, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., 
http://www.aicpa.org/Pages/Default.aspx ( last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (display- 
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tive mark does not indicate that the goods or services come 
from a particular source, but ―indicate[s] that their source is af-
filiated with a particular group.‖233 Whereas certification 
marks may be used by anyone who complies with the standards 
of the mark, collective marks may only be used by particular 
members of an organization.234  
However, in the vast majority of cases, there is no source 
confusion with fashion design marks.235 Most consumers can 
tell the difference between a blouse from Target and a blouse 
from Chanel. However, new designers do not have the same 
brand recognition as established designers.236 If an established 
designer copies an emerging designer before the emerging de-
signer‘s garments are on the rack, the consumer may not know 
which design is the original.237 In this scenario, there is a con-
cern for attribution for the new designer. Without arbitration, 
the new designer may easily be cut out of the fashion cycle, 
harming the individual designer, economically and morally, as 
well as harming consumers by depriving the market of innova-
tion and competition. 
Certification and collective marks present attribution solu-
tions that address this concern. A fashion design certification 
mark would allow designers to distinguish original designs 
from copied designs, while communicating a unique source to 
consumers. A term, such as ―couture‖ or ―original design‖ or 
―slow fashion‖ could be applied to apparel tags to indicate that 
the garment was originally designed without line-by-line copy-
ing. A fashion design certification mark would certify an au-
thentic ―mode of manufacture‖ and consequently ―quality‖ and 
―accuracy‖ of an original design.238 This mark would not be 
owned by any designer in particular, but by the group and 
would be ―available without discrimination to certify the goods 
of any person who maintains the standards or conditions which 
 
ing the CPA logo as the official insignia of the Society of Certified Public Ac-
countants). 
 233. MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 99 (2005); see 
also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (articulating a similar explanation regarding a collective 
mark‘s expression of association). 
 234. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 235. Cf. Splurge vs. Steal: Stripes, MARIE CLAIRE (Feb. 26, 2008), http:// 
www.marieclaire.com/fashion/tips/splurge-vs-steal/splurge-steal-stripes. 
 236. Scadifi Statement, supra note 161, at 82–83. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
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such mark certifies.‖239 Fast fashion retailers will likely not be 
affected by a mark on original garments, but it serves a valua-
ble purpose to prevent source confusion in the marketplace and 
to provide a limited moral rights protection for fashion  
designers. 
In the alternative, a similar idea could be implemented 
through a collective mark. The Council of Fashion Designers of 
America could create a collective mark in which designers who 
are part of the organization would be able to join. The CFDA 
then could set standards for original designs, which may be 
similar to the proposed substantially identical standard in the 
IDPPPA.  
The Fair Trade Mark for clothing and VARA provide valu-
able models for a fashion certification mark in order to craft a 
limited protection that will blend with the current intellectual 
property laws in the United States. Certification marks are 
most commonly applied to food,240 but Fair Trade USA recently 
launched a new fair trade certification mark for apparel.241 
This Fair Trade certification indicates quality from farm to fac-
tory,242 and serves as a model for communicating design au-
thenticity. Similarly, VARA serves as a guide, as a recent ex-
pansion of moral rights. Whereas VARA includes a right to 
attribution and integrity, the fashion mark would be limited to 
attribution, because clothing is functional and thus prone to ac-
cidental modifications. 
The limited goal of preserving a right of attribution 
through a certification or collective mark responds to the needs 
in the fashion design community. This solution allows fashion 
victims to opt in for some protection, while maintaining the 
unique copying dynamic that fashion pirates enjoy. 
 
 239. Id. § 1064(5)(D); see Cmty. of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 
303 F.2d 494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962). 
 240. E.g., Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass‘n of Am., 104 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 
1997) (analyzing kosher certification marks, which ―are used to designate food 
items that comply with Judaism‘s strict dietary laws‖).  
 241. E.g., Apparel & Linens Program, FAIR TRADE USA (Sept. 11, 2011, 
4:40 PM), http://www.transfairusa.org/certification/producers/apparel-linens; 
Lorraine Sanders, Fashion First: Fair Trade Certification Finally Available for 
Apparel, SFUNZIPPED, S.F. CHRON. ONLINE (July 23, 2010, 2:00 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/chronstyle/detail?entry_id=68495.  
 242. See Sanders, supra note 241; Ariel Schwartz, TransFair USA Intro-
duces First Fair-Trade Clothing to the U.S., FAST COMPANY (July 19, 2010), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/1671772/transfair-usa-introduces-first-fair-trade-
clothing-to-the-us. 
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  CONCLUSION   
In considering the legal conundrum of knockoffs, fashion 
emerges as an incomparable industry. Clothing is an anomaly 
because it is both artistic and functional, new and old, distinc-
tive and indistinctive, and it does not fit neatly into a legal 
framework. Copying—whether considered design piracy or 
sharing—plays a vital role in the unique, creative culture of the 
fashion world, and any proposed intellectual property changes 
must consider the industry norms. 
Although copying benefits the industry, the negative effect 
on emerging designers is a legitimate concern, but the proposed 
legislation is not the appropriate remedy. The costs of sui ge-
neris copyright protection greatly outweigh the potential bene-
fits. Knockoffs are not harming the thriving fashion industry as 
a whole, but actually playing an important role in the cycle of 
trends. A solution that balances the desire for limited moral 
rights without disturbing the copying dynamic would be a bet-
ter fit. A certification or collective mark that communicates au-
thenticity to the consumer would allow designers to opt in to 
distinguish their original designs without forcing new rules on 
a thriving industry. 
